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Distinguishing Income from Substitution Effects in
Disability Insurance
By David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan*
A set of studies conducted over the last 15
years has produced a near consensus that the
Social Security Disability Insurance system
(SSDI) has substantial disincentive effects on
the labor supply of near elderly males, diminishing labor force participation, increasing the sensitivity of labor force exit decisions to adverse
economic shocks, and encouraging those nearing retirement to claim disability benefits and
subsequently transfer into the Social Security
retirement program. Yet, efforts by the Social
Security Administration (SSA) to encourage
labor supply among the disabled by removing
the work disincentives built into SSDI have been
almost entirely unsuccessful. Most notably, in
1999, Congress authorized the Ticket to Work
program, which provides an array of inducements for current SSDI beneficiaries to take up
employment, including permitting a trial work
period of up to nine months, providing 7.75 years
of ongoing Medicare eligibility following return
to work, and providing three years of automatic
benefit reinstatement when claimants’ workplace earnings fall below a threshold level. Each
of these steps reduces the implicit tax placed
on labor supply by the SSDI program. Despite
these lures, fewer than 1,400 (0.01 percent) of
the 12.2 million tickets issued to date have led
to successful workforce integration (Autor and
Duggan 2006).

This paper calls attention to, and presents
preliminary evidence on, a neglected explanation of why efforts to encourage the disabled to
return to work by reducing the implicit tax on
labor supply have met with little success. Our
core observation is that SSDI, and indeed all
nonwork-contingent retirement programs, discourage work through two channels. The first
is the canonical substitution effect: because
a return to work ultimately means sacrificing
benefits (what some beneficiaries call “the cash
cliff”), SSDI recipients face a financial incentive to remain nonemployed. The second is the
income effect—given the transfer payments
and in-kind services (particularly medical care)
provided by SSDI, many beneficiaries may prefer leisure to labor or, more precisely, an early
retirement, even if work is not implicitly taxed
by the SSDI program. Concretely, a hypothetical SSDI beneficiary granted $12,000 per year
in income support plus Medicare benefits covering an average of $7,700 annually in health
care expenses may prefer an early retirement
over continued participation in the labor force.
This scenario seems particularly plausible when
one considers that the modal SSDI recipient is a
near-elderly male with a high-school education
(thus, below-median potential earnings on average) and possibly a significant degree of physical discomfort in performing workplace tasks.
The distinction between these two channels—income and substitution effects—through
which SSDI reduces labor supply and expedites
early retirement is central to policy. To our
knowledge, all prior efforts by Congress and the
SSA to increase labor force participation among
SSDI recipients—including the Ticket to Work
program—have targeted the substitution effect.
That is, they have reduced the implicit tax on
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On the first point, see John Bound and Timothy
Waidmann (1992) and David C. Stapleton and Richard V.
Burkhauser (2003). On the second point, see Daniel Black,
Kermit Daniel, and Seth Sanders (2002) and Autor and
Duggan (2003). On the third point, see Duggan, Perry,
Singleton, and Jae Song (forthcoming).



Reinforcing this point, Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst
(2005) demonstrate that the fall in living standards that
workers experience at the time of retirement is much less
precipitous than measured declines in expenditure would
suggest.
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work. Such policies rest on the assumption that,
were it not for the implicit tax that SSDI levies
on labor supply, many beneficiaries would prefer to work (i.e., while keeping their benefits).
If, however, the primary means by which SSDI
reduces labor force participation and hastens
retirement is through an income effect, such
efforts may be close to ineffectual.
The conceptual distinction between income
and substitution effects is also central to welfare
analysis. If SSDI reduces labor supply through
the substitution effect, this implies a deadweight
loss. In effect, SSDI pays beneficiaries not to
work. By contrast, reductions in labor supply that
are due to the income effect do not imply a deadweight loss since there is no distortion of incentives (though, of course, the funding of transfer
programs may incur deadweight losses).
I. Estimating Income Effects of Disability
Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply

We know of no research that attempts to distinguish income from substitution effects in the
relationship between SSDI receipt and labor
supply (aside from our companion work on this
topic, Autor and Duggan 2007). A likely reason
is that, since its inception, the SSDI program has
provided benefits exclusively on a work-contingent basis, so income and substitution effects
cannot readily be separated. SSDI is not, however, the sole transfer program that provides
income support to the nonelderly disabled.
Though almost ignored by researchers, the US
Department of Veterans’ Affairs Disability
Compensation program (VDC) provides substantial cash benefits and health insurance
through the Veterans Health Administration
to more than 2.7 million disabled veterans of
military service. Unlike SSDI benefits, VDC
benefits are not work-contingent (nor are they
means tested). Hence, any reduction in labor
supply—generally in the form of early retirement or a shift to part-time work—caused by
the award of VDC benefits is plausibly attributable to the pure “income effect” of receiving an
unconditional, lifetime grant of monthly income
and health insurance.

Dora L. Costa (1995) estimates sizable income effects
of pension benefits on the labor supply of Union Army
soldiers following the US Civil War. Raj Chetty (2005)
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The key requirement for VDC eligibility
is that a veteran’s disability must be caused or
aggravated by military service. Due to this stipulation, veterans rarely qualify for VDC benefits
for medical conditions that develop late in life,
such as cancer or diabetes, since these conditions
are not normally directly attributable to military
service. In 2001, a unique policy change within
the VDC program unexpectedly extended cash
disability benefits and enhanced medical care
to near-elderly veterans of the Vietnam era. In
response to a National Institute of Medicine
study linking exposure to Agent Orange (a herbicide used extensively in Vietnam) to diabetes,
the Department of Veterans’ Affairs added diabetes to the list of conditions for which a veteran
who served in the Vietnam War could qualify
for (or increase) VDC benefits.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the unanticipated
extension of benefits in 2001 coincided with a
sharp break in trend in VDC enrollment. While
in the four years prior to the policy change (1997
though 2001), the number of VDC beneficiaries
grew at only 0.6 percent annually, the annual
growth rate jumped to 3.2 percent between
2001 and 2006. Estimates by Duggan, Robert
Rosenheck, and Perry Singleton (2006) suggest
that the 2001 policy change increased the number of Vietnam veterans in the VDC program
in September of 2006 by approximately 175,000
over what it would otherwise have been (2.3
percent of all Vietnam-era veterans still alive at
that time). An additional 75,000 Vietnam veterans (1.0 percent) who were already receiving
VDC received an increase in their benefits as a
result of the Agent Orange decision. This policy change provides an opportunity to study the
income effect of receipt of disability benefits on
the labor supply and retirement decisions of a
relevant population of near-elderly individuals,
the majority of whom were work-capable at the
time of benefit receipt though not necessarily in
good health.

distinguishes income from substitution effects in the effect
of unemployment insurance benefits on job spell durations.

In total, approximately 11 percent of individuals who
had “boots on the ground” in Vietnam during the conflict
were affected directly.
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Figure 1. Number of Veterans Disability Compensation Recipients, 1976–2006
Source: US Department of Veterans Affairs, published and unpublished data.

II. Preliminary Analysis Using the Current
Population Survey

Our informal discussion above, and a formal
model given in Autor and Duggan (2007), suggests that unanticipated increases in unearned
income caused by the change in the VDC program should have reduced labor supply among
a subset of individuals affected by the policy
despite the absence of nonwork incentives in the
VDC program. To provide an initial test of these
labor supply effects, we utilize data from the
annual March Supplement to the Current Popu
lation Survey (CPS) for calendar years 2000
through 2006 (earnings years 1999 through
2005). The March CPS has a number of virtues
for our analysis. It offers detailed individuallevel information on labor supply measures and
it collects information on each person’s veteran
status and lists their service era if relevant (e.g.,
Vietnam, Korea, etc.) It also provides detailed
self-reported information on numerous components of unearned income, including benefits
from the Veterans Administration (VA), Social
Security, and all other retirement and disability
income.
Because 97 percent of Vietnam-era veterans
are males, according to the March 2001 CPS,
we focus exclusively on males in our empirical analyses. Additionally, nearly 80 percent of
Vietnam-era veterans were born between 1941

and 1952, and 30 percent of all currently living
men born between 1941 and 1952 and alive in
2001 were Vietnam-era veterans (with a maximum of 44 percent for the 1947 birth cohort). We
therefore further restrict attention to Vietnamera veteran males born between 1941 and 1952.
We compare labor supply measures for
Vietnam-era veterans before and after the Agent
Orange policy change with the corresponding
trends for observably similar individuals who
were not directly affected. The use of an appropriate control group should serve to capture the
effect of other factors, such as aging and macroeconomic conditions, that might also have influenced the labor supply decisions of near-elderly
men during our study period. Perhaps the ideal
control group for our analysis would be Vietnamera veterans who did not serve in Vietnam, as
these individuals were in the military during the
same period as “boots on the ground” veterans,
but their VDC coverage was not expanded similarly by the Agent Orange policy. Unfortunately,
the March CPS does not provide information on
where veterans actually served (only when), so
we must select an alternative control group.


Our in-progress work in Autor and Duggan (2007)
exploits detailed data from the US military to individually
identify Vietnam-era soldiers who did and did not have
“boots on the ground.”
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In the absence of the preferred comparison
group, there are two other logical candidates:
other veteran males born between 1941 and 1952
and nonveteran males born during this same
period. Unfortunately, there are relatively few
veterans from other service eras in these 12 birth
cohorts. In the 1946 to 1949 birth cohorts, the
ratio of Vietnam-era veterans to all other veterans is 14.4 to 1. In contrast, the number of nonveteran males born during this period is substantial
and exceeds the number of Vietnam-era veteran
males in every one of our 12 birth cohorts of
interest. We therefore use nonveteran males as
a control group, but we emphasize that the comparison is not ideal. For example, according to
the March 2001 CPS, just 4 percent of Vietnamera veterans born between 1941 and 1952 are
high-school dropouts versus 15 percent of nonveteran males born during these same years.
Interestingly, nonveteran males are much more
likely to have a college degree than veterans (35
percent versus 28 percent). Recognizing that our
treatment and control groups differed in potentially important ways prior to the policy change,
we view this CPS-based analysis as exploratory,
with definitive evidence awaiting better data.
We estimate specifications of the following type:
(1)

Yit 5 b0 VEVit 1 b1 VEVit 3 POSTt
1 Ait 1 Si 1 Ri 1 lt 1 1 Ait 3 lt 2

1 1 Si 1 lit 2 1 1 Ri 3 lt 2 1 eit.

In this equation, i and t denote individuals and
years, respectively. The variable VEVit takes
on a value of one if individual i is a Vietnamera veteran and zero otherwise. We define the
variable POST to equal zero in both 1999 and
2000, prior to the policy change, and to equal
one from 2002 through 2005. Since the policy
change occurred in July of 2001, we set the
POST variable to 0.5 in this year. All specifications control for a vector of background
characteristics including 12 single year-of-age
indicators (A), four education indicators (S),
and three race indicators (R), each interacted
with a vector of seven year indicators (l).
The coefficient of interest in this equation is
b1, which measures the differential change in
the outcome variable of interest, Y, for Vietnam-
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era veterans following the policy change. The
identifying assumption of this model is that,
absent the policy change, the change in Y
would have been comparable for Vietnam-era
veteran males and nonveteran males after controlling for the interactions of race, education,
and single year of age with year. Under these
assumptions, b1 measures the average causal
effect of the change in the VDC program on
Vietnam-era veterans.
The first column presents estimates for the
probability of being out of the labor force during 1999 through 2005. The highly significant
point estimate of 23.21 for b1 indicates that
between 2001 and 2005, labor force participation of Vietnam-era veteran males fell by more
than 3 percentage points relative to that of similarly aged nonveteran males. Notably, labor
force participation of Vietnam-era veterans
was slightly higher than that of nonveterans in
the pre-policy period (0.36 percentage points),
but this contrast was not significant.
Columns 2 and 3 reveal that the differential decline in labor force participation among
Vietnam-era veterans is accounted for, in
roughly equal proportions, by a rise in the
probability of being retired and a rise in the
probability of being out of the labor force due
to disability. Notably, veterans did not become
significantly more likely than nonveterans to
be out of the labor force for reasons other than
retirement or disability (see column 4).
Complementing these findings, column 5
shows that, after 2001, there is a significant
increase in the probability that Vietnam-era
veterans report a work-limiting disability or
health condition relative to nonveteran males
of the same age. This finding may indicate that
there was a differential decline in the health of
veterans after 2001. Or it may reflect the fact
that, all else equal, those who receive disability payments are more likely to report themselves as disabled (John Bound and Timothy
Waidmann 1992; Michael Baker, Mark Stabile,
and Catherine Deri 2004). In untabulated
results, our March data also show a significant
differential rise after 2001 in the probability
that Vietnam-era vets received unearned income
from the Veterans Administration or the Social
Security Administration. These increases likely
reflect a combination of disability and pension
payments.

Distinguishing Income from Substitution Effects

VOL. 97 NO. 2

123

Table 1—Measures of Labor Force Attachment Before and After the 2001 Policy Change:
Contrasting Vietnam Era Veteran versus Non-Veteran Males

Vietnam-era veteran
VEV * Post
Mean
R-squared

(1)
NILF

(2)
NILF–Retired

(3)
NILF–Disabled

(4)
NILF–Other

(5)
Any disability

0.36
(0.64)
3.21*
(0.85)
20.1
0.091

0.92*
(0.41)
1.77*
(0.59)
8.6
0.086

0.09
(0.47)
1.31*
(0.61)
8.6
0.068

20.66*
(0.27)
0.12
(0.34)
2.8
0.008

1.47*
(0.59)
1.30*
(0.75)
13.5
0.062

Notes: Table entries represent coefficient estimates from linear probability models. The dependent variable for each specification is listed at the top of each column. “NILF” denotes Not in Labor Force. All specifications include race (three categories) by year interactions, education (four categories) by year interactions, and age (12 single-year categories) by year
interactions. The number of observations is 75,952 in all specifications. Sample includes all Vietnam-era veteran males and
all nonveteran males born between 1941 and 1952 inclusive (with year-of-birth approximated as survey year–1–age). Seven
years of the March CPS (2000–2006) are used. Specifications are weighted by person weights (scaled by the inverse of the
sum of person weights for the sample) and robust standard errors are included in parentheses. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.
* Signficantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.

One item of concern for our empirical strategy
is also visible in Table 1. Column 5 reveals that,
even prior to the 2001 policy change, Vietnamera veterans were significantly more likely (1.47
percentage points, or 11 percent) than nonveteran males to report a work-limiting disability.
This baseline difference is by no means puzzling. Many Vietnam-era veterans saw combat, which is known to have lasting, negative,
long-term effects on health (Kelly Bedard and
Olivier Deschênes 2006). Nevertheless, this
contrast underscores that nonveteran males
provide an imperfect comparison group for
veteran males of comparable age.
III. Conclusions

Our results provide initial evidence that the
increase in unearned income resulting from the
expansion of the VDC program’s medical eligibility criteria in 2001 substantially reduced
labor-force participation among Vietnam-era
veterans. Such large behavioral responses to
the VDC program are noteworthy given that the
program does not affect the incentive to work
as does the SSDI program and its means-tested
counterpart the Supplemental Security Income
program. These findings, therefore, highlight
the possibility that income effects on labor supply may be sizable for near-elderly adults in
moderate to poor health.

We stress that these results must be viewed as
preliminary. Perhaps the most important limitation of our analysis is that nonveteran males
differ in many observable and presumably unobservable ways from Vietnam-era veteran males.
Thus, the differential declines in labor supply
observed here may have occurred even in the
absence of this policy change. A definitive test
of the labor-supply response to the extension of
VDC benefits awaits better data (which we are
currently compiling).
Accurately assessing the magnitude of income
and substitution effects of receipt of transfer
income on labor supply is critical to US disability policy. While economists have typically
regarded the substantial reductions in labor force
participation associated with receipt of disability benefits as an incentive problem (i.e., a substitution effect), it appears plausible to us that a
significant share of this response is explained by
the (nonincentive) income effect. When granted
permanent, inflation-indexed income and government-provided health insurance, many nearelderly adults in moderate to poor health may
prefer an early retirement to continued labor
force participation. If so, there may be limited
scope for public policy to increase a return to
work among nonelderly disability recipients
by reducing the implicit tax on labor income
as is done, for example, by the Social Secur
ity Administration’s Ticket-to-Work program.
For this reason and the others outlined above,
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further study of the effect of the labor supply
effects of the VDC program—which currently
provides cash benefits and health insurance to
more than 11 percent of military veterans—is
warranted.
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